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Automatic withdrawals

Automatic withdrawals move money out of your Invoise wallet without a confirmation for each withdrawal. For each network you set a threshold; once the wallet holds that much there, the whole balance of that network goes to one external address of yours. Your own signing server signs the transactions and Invoise adds the second signature.

You set them up in the dashboard: Wallet → Security → Withdrawal automation → Set up. Each rule under Rules by network names:

  • From network: the network whose balance is withdrawn. One rule per network.
  • To network: where the money goes. It may be the same network, then no bridge is used.
  • Token: one of the tokens Invoise supports on the destination network.
  • Threshold in dollars: from the minimum withdrawal, with at most two decimals.

Payments in Tron and Solana reach the wallet on Arbitrum (see Solana and Tron), so they count under the Arbitrum rule. There is no separate Tron or Solana rule.

When the wallet holds at least the threshold on a source network, Invoise withdraws the whole balance of that network, whatever stablecoins it is in, less the fee, to the Recipient address. The destination network’s own balance stays where it is. A stablecoin that no bridge can carry into the payout token, such as USDT0 on Arbitrum for USDC on Base, is first swapped into that network’s USDC on Uniswap, and Circle’s CCTP then moves the USDC. A stablecoin of the payout token’s family travels through Across, and a rule whose destination is its source swaps on that network, as a manual withdrawal does. The fee is the same as for a manual withdrawal.

Invoise checks the rules every minute and sends one automatic withdrawal at a time: the first rule whose network reached its threshold.

Setting Meaning
No more often than No limit, or once an hour, every 3, 6 or 12 hours, once a day or once a week.
Turn off after failures in a row 1 to 10, 3 by default. After a failure the next attempt waits 5 minutes, then 30 minutes, then 2 hours. You are notified of the first failure in a row and when automatic withdrawals turn off.
Fee no more than 0.5%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 5% or 10% of the amount that reaches the recipient, 1% by default.

The fee cap covers network gas of every step. When gas costs more, the withdrawal from that network waits: the dashboard shows Waiting for a lower fee with the fee and the amount, and the withdrawal goes once the balance has grown or gas got cheaper. A wait is not a failure. Bridge and swap fees grow with the amount and are bounded by the route: a swap that would lose more than 3% is refused.

The wallet’s daily limit and pause apply to automatic withdrawals too. Turning them off and tightening the rules take effect at once. With the cooldown on, turning them on, another signing server or recipient, a new or redirected rule, a lower threshold or interval, more tolerated failures and a higher fee cap take effect only after the cooldown; the dashboard shows when, and the change can be cancelled until then. Every change sends a security notice and, when the account has 2FA, asks for a second factor.

The wallet is a Safe with a 2-of-3 threshold, so every withdrawal needs two signatures. The Invoise co-signer gives one of them. For a manual withdrawal the other comes from your merchant key, which never leaves your browser, so it cannot sign while you are away.

Invoise never holds two keys of your wallet. For automatic withdrawals the second signature comes from your own signing server, which holds one of the wallet keys you control: the delegate key or your merchant key. Invoise accepts either one without asking which; the choice decides what a leaked server key can do:

  • Delegate key. The Invoise co-signer accepts the delegate’s signature on its own only while automatic withdrawals are on and only for payouts to the recipient address you set; anything else still needs your merchant key. A leaked server key therefore cannot send money elsewhere through Invoise.
  • Merchant key. Nothing more to set up, but the co-signer accepts the merchant key for everything you can do yourself. A leaked server key can withdraw to any address, change protections and replace keys through Invoise; only the daily limit, the pause and the cooldown still apply. The key then lives on the server as well as in your browser.

A server with the delegate key also has every power a delegate has: alone it can queue a withdrawal through the delay module, which executes after three days unless you cancel it (see If Invoise is unavailable). Keep the server key as safe as the wallet key.

  1. Run a signing server that follows the protocol at a public HTTPS URL. Local and private addresses are rejected.
  2. Open Wallet → Security → Withdrawal automation → Set up and press Issue a secret under Signing server. The secret is shown once: save it on your server. Issue a new one replaces it, and requests signed with the old one stop verifying at once.
  3. Enter the Signing server URL, the Recipient address, the rules and the limits, turn on the Automatic withdrawals on switch and press Save. Invoise asks the server to identify itself and shows its key as Server key.
  4. If the server’s key is your merchant key, the status becomes Active at once and setup is done. Otherwise the section says The signing server is not the delegate. Press Make delegate. While the wallet is not deployed on any network, the server becomes the delegate at once; otherwise confirm the transaction with your merchant key on each deployed network. A current delegate is replaced. A delegate change is a security change, so with the cooldown on it pauses withdrawals.
  5. Once the server is the delegate, Invoise lets its co-signer accept the server’s signature for your recipient address, and the status becomes Active.
Status Meaning
Disabled Automatic withdrawals are off.
Waiting for delegate The server’s key is neither your merchant key nor the wallet’s delegate: press Make delegate.
Retrying after an error The last attempt failed; the dashboard shows the error and the failures in a row.
Active Withdrawals run by the rules.

A new signing server saved while the cooldown is on waits for the cooldown like any loosening. If you make it the delegate before the change takes effect, the current settings point to a server that is no longer the delegate, and nothing is withdrawn until the change applies.

Invoise sends every request as POST to your signing server URL with a JSON body, Content-Type: application/json, User-Agent: Invoise-Automation/1 and the header Invoise-Signature: t=<unix time>,v1=<hex>. The signature is HMAC-SHA256 of t + "." + raw_body. The HMAC key is the whole secret string as shown in the dashboard, ias_ prefix included (ias_ and 64 hex characters).

This is the scheme of webhooks, and the verify function there works unchanged with this secret. The server MUST reject a request whose signature does not verify or whose t is more than 5 minutes away from its own clock. The signature covers only the time and the body, so the server MUST answer a repeated operation_id with the signatures it already gave, or with a refusal, and never sign different data under the same operation_id.

The server answers 200 with a JSON body; any other status is a refusal. The whole answer must arrive within 30 seconds and be at most 1 MiB. Redirects are not followed.

Sent when you save a new signing server URL. The address recovered from the answer becomes the server key. It counts once it is your merchant key or the wallet’s delegate; any other key you then make the delegate.

{
"type": "identify",
"wallet": "0x41d97e9d7b8d051f1ac4adaf92ca1e7b8c788375",
"message": "Invoise automatic withdrawals\nWallet: 0x41d97e9d7b8d051f1ac4adaf92ca1e7b8c788375\nServer: https://signer.example.com/invoise\nNonce: 5f0c4a7e9b2d81f3a6c0e47d1b9a2f68\nIssued At: 2026-10-04T12:00:00Z"
}

Answer with an EIP-191 personal_sign signature of message, exactly as received, made with the server’s key (the delegate or your merchant key), and that key’s address:

{ "address": "0x5b38da6a701c568545dcfcb03fcb875f56beddc4", "signature": "0x…" }

The address must be the one the signature recovers to, and it may not be the Invoise co-signer.

Sent once for each automatic withdrawal. This one moves USDT0 and USDC from Arbitrum to USDC on Base:

{
"type": "sign",
"operation_id": "9b0f5c2e-4a1d-4f6b-8c3e-2d7a9e1f0b64",
"wallet": "0x41d97e9d7b8d051f1ac4adaf92ca1e7b8c788375",
"source_chain_id": 42161,
"chain_id": 8453,
"token": "0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913",
"symbol": "USDC",
"decimals": 6,
"amount": "249310000",
"payee": "0x2f1e7c3b9a4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b",
"total_fee_usd": "0.11",
"legs": [
{
"position": 0,
"chain_id": 42161,
"safe": "0x41d97e9d7b8d051f1ac4adaf92ca1e7b8c788375",
"fee_recipient": "0x…",
"intent": "swap",
"safe_tx": { "to": "0x9641d764fc13c8b624c04430c7356c1c7c8102e2", "value": "0", "data": "0x8d80ff0a…", "operation": 1, "nonce": "4" },
"hash": "0x…",
"token": "0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831",
"symbol": "USDC",
"decimals": 6,
"amount": "0",
"fee": { "token": "0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831", "amount": "37000" },
"swap": { "router": "0x…", "spender": "0x…", "token_in": "0xfd086bc7cd5c481dcc9c85ebe478a1c0b69fcbb9", "amount_in": "120000000", "token_out": "0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831", "min_out": "119380000" },
"bridge": null,
"deploys": false
},
{
"position": 1,
"chain_id": 42161,
"safe": "0x41d97e9d7b8d051f1ac4adaf92ca1e7b8c788375",
"fee_recipient": "0x…",
"intent": "burn",
"safe_tx": { "to": "0x9641d764fc13c8b624c04430c7356c1c7c8102e2", "value": "0", "data": "0x8d80ff0a…", "operation": 1, "nonce": "5" },
"hash": "0x…",
"token": "0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831",
"symbol": "USDC",
"decimals": 6,
"amount": "249400000",
"fee": { "token": "0xaf88d065e77c8cc2239327c5edb3a432268e5831", "amount": "30000" },
"swap": null,
"bridge": null,
"deploys": false
},
{
"position": 3,
"chain_id": 8453,
"safe": "0x41d97e9d7b8d051f1ac4adaf92ca1e7b8c788375",
"fee_recipient": "0x…",
"intent": "withdraw",
"safe_tx": { "to": "0x9641d764fc13c8b624c04430c7356c1c7c8102e2", "value": "0", "data": "0x8d80ff0a…", "operation": 1, "nonce": "0" },
"hash": "0x…",
"token": "0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913",
"symbol": "USDC",
"decimals": 6,
"amount": "249310000",
"fee": { "token": "0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913", "amount": "20000" },
"swap": null,
"bridge": null,
"deploys": true
}
]
}
Field Meaning
operation_id One automatic withdrawal.
source_chain_id, chain_id, token, amount, payee The rule’s source network and what reaches the recipient on the destination network.
total_fee_usd The network fee of every step, in USD.
legs The Safe transactions to sign. A CCTP receipt or an Across fill needs no signature, so positions can skip numbers.
safe The wallet’s Safe address on the leg’s network.
intent withdraw, swap, burn or bridge.
safe_tx The Safe transaction: to, value, data, operation, nonce.
fee, fee_recipient The leg’s network fee and where it is paid.
swap, bridge The swap or Across deposit the leg makes, otherwise null.
deploys The Safe has no code on that network yet: it is deployed in the same transaction, and the nonce is 0.

Amounts, nonces and value are decimal strings in token units; decimals and operation are numbers.

Answer with one signature per leg:

{ "signatures": [ { "position": 0, "signature": "0x…" }, { "position": 1, "signature": "0x…" }, { "position": 3, "signature": "0x…" } ] }

Each signature is the server key’s 65-byte ECDSA signature (r‖s‖v, v as 27/28 or 0/1) of the leg’s SafeTx hash. A signature that recovers to neither the wallet’s delegate nor your merchant key fails the withdrawal with automation_signature_invalid.

The server’s key is one of the two signatures the Safe needs, so your server is the check that keeps Invoise from ever acting alone. Before signing a leg it MUST:

  1. Compute the hash itself. Compute the Safe 1.4.1 EIP-712 hash and sign only that, never the hash field as given. Domain: EIP712Domain(uint256 chainId,address verifyingContract) with the leg’s chain_id and safe. Message: SafeTx(address to,uint256 value,bytes data,uint8 operation,uint256 safeTxGas,uint256 baseGas,uint256 gasPrice,address gasToken,address refundReceiver,uint256 nonce) with to, value, data, operation and nonce from safe_tx, safeTxGas, baseGas and gasPrice set to 0, and gasToken and refundReceiver set to the zero address. safe must be the wallet it serves on that network.

  2. Check the batch. operation 1 (DELEGATECALL) is allowed only to MultiSendCallOnly 0x9641d764fc13c8b624c04430c7356c1c7c8102e2 calling multiSend(bytes), and every item of the batch must be a plain call (operation 0) with value 0. A single call comes with operation 0. Refuse any other DELEGATECALL and any Safe administration: swapOwner, addOwnerWithThreshold, removeOwner, changeThreshold, enableModule, disableModule, setGuard, setFallbackHandler, execTransactionFromModule, or any call to the Safe itself.

  3. Check every call. Exactly one transfer(fee_recipient, fee.amount) of fee.token. An approve only for the exact amount the next call spends: to swap.spender for swap.token_in and swap.amount_in, to the CCTP TokenMessengerV2 0x28b5a0e9c621a5badaa536219b3a228c8168cf5d for the burned amount, or to bridge.spoke_pool for bridge.token_in and bridge.amount_in. Then by intent:

    • withdraw: a transfer of the payout token to the recipient address the server has on record;
    • swap: a call to swap.router whose output stays in the Safe;
    • burn: depositForBurn on TokenMessengerV2 with mintRecipient set to the Safe, padded to 32 bytes;
    • bridge: depositV3 on bridge.spoke_pool with the Safe as both depositor and recipient.

    Refuse anything else.

  4. Apply its own limits. Compare amount and total_fee_usd with its own limits, such as per withdrawal, per day and fee share, and the recipient with its own configuration, never with the request’s payee.

The Invoise co-signer applies the same rules before it signs, so a correct request always passes them. The server repeats them because it must not trust Invoise.

Your server can read what it checks against from Invoise, signed with the same secret. Send GET to https://platform.invoise.me/api/v1/automation/<resource>?wallet=<Safe address> with the header Invoise-Signature: t=<unix time>,v1=<hex>, where v1 is HMAC-SHA256 of t + "." + path and query, for example 1791200000./api/v1/automation/settings?wallet=0x41d9…. It is the signing function of webhooks with the request path in place of the body. t may differ from Invoise’s clock by at most 5 minutes. A wrong signature, a stale t, an unknown wallet and a wallet without a secret all answer 401.

Path Answer
/automation/settings The recipient, rules, limits, status and pending change; owners (merchant, delegate, cosigner), server_key_role (merchant, delegate or empty) and the wallet’s protections (daily limit, cooldown, pause).
/automation/networks Per network: safe, deployed, tokens, fee_recipient, multisend, and where the network supports them cctp (token_messenger, domain, usdc), swap (router, spender) and across (spoke_pool), otherwise null.
/automation/operations Automatic withdrawals, newest first, with their steps, statuses and transaction hashes; limit from 1 to 100, 50 by default.
/automation/operations/{id} One automatic withdrawal, for example the operation_id of a sign request.

Use the answers to fill in and compare your server’s own configuration, not as the check itself. They come from the same Invoise your server guards against, so the recipient, the limits and the allowed contracts the server signs against must be its own.

These codes appear in the dashboard, in the failure notice and when saving the settings.

Code Meaning
automation_server_unreachable The server did not answer within 30 seconds, or its URL is no longer a public HTTPS address.
automation_server_refused The server answered with a status other than 200; most often it still has an old secret.
automation_server_invalid The answer was not valid JSON of the expected shape, the identify signature does not recover to the given address, or the key is the co-signer.
automation_signature_invalid A signature recovers to neither the wallet’s delegate nor your merchant key: the server’s key changed. Save the URL again so the server identifies itself, then make it the delegate if it is not your merchant key.
route_unavailable, swap_quote_failed No bridge or swap route can move this balance now. Raise the threshold or use a rule within one network.